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COMMENTS
AN ATTORNEY'S LIABILITY TO HIS CLIENT
it is not improbable that the young lawyer, in preparing for his profes-
sion, has given little, if any, thought to his possible liability to his client for
negligence or lack of skill. What follows is an attempt to place before
members of the Bar a general survey of the attorney's duty to his client and
his liability for the breach of that duty. There has been much litigation on
the subject, evidencing the need for such a discussion.
The relationship of attorney and client is generally governed by the
law of agency.' This relation, by its very nature, is one of great trust and
confidence.2 The attorney undertakes to protect and care for the rights
and interests of the client and, in so doing, he is bound to exercise the
highest degree of honor, integrity and fidelity.' A breach of fidelity to the
client's interest, or a failure to use reasonable care in the conduct of the
business in which he is employed not only gives the client a right to redress
for damages suffered,4 but subjects the attorney to the summar, jurisdiction
of the court for dereliction of duty.5 In addition to this, le may suffer
public humiliation for having failed in his duty or trust. We are concerned
here only with the attorney's liability to his client.
It is generally stated that the duties and liabilities between attorney and
client are the same as those between physician and patient." In the
absence of express agreement an attorney who holds himself out for public
employment impliedly warrants to his employer that he possesses that
reasonable degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by members of
the profession. He contracts that he will use reasonable and ordinary care
and diligence in the exertion of his skills and the application of his knowl-
edge to accomplish the purpose for which he is employed7 If he fails in
either respect he will be responsible to his client for the loss which the
failure causes.8 The lawyer does not, however, guarantee the soundness of
his opinion, or that the outcome of litigation will be successful, He is not
answerable for an error of judgment in his conduct of a case, or for every
1. MECHEM, OUTLINES or AGENCY § 76 (4th ed. 1952).
2. Harvey v. Rowe, 141 Fla. 287, 192 So. 878 (1940); Kloss v. State, 95 Fla. 433,
116 So. 39 (1928); United States v. Pittman, 80 Fla. 423, 86 So. 567 (1920); SToay,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 311 (1835).
3. floss v. State, 95 Fla. 433, 116 So. 39 (1928).
4. Fiske.v. Duder, 125 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1942).
5. Holland v. Flournoy, 142 Fla. 459, 195 So. 138 (1940); In re Clifton, 115 Fla.
168, 155 So. 324 (1934); Could v. State, 99 Fla. 662, 127 So. 309 (1930).
6. Slade v. Harris, 105 Conn. 436. 135 AtL. 570 (1927); Olson v. North, 276 Ill.
App. 457(1934); McCullough v. Sullivan, 102 N.J.L. 381, 132 Ati. 102 (1926).
7. McCullough, v. Sullivan, 102 N..L. 381, 132 Atl. 102 (1926).
8. Watson v. Calvert, 91 Md. 25, 45 Atl. 879 (1900).
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mistake which may occur in practice.9 Thus, the attorney contracts that he
has reasonable skill and knowledge-but ndt that lie is infallible.
The degree of skill and knowledge required in a particular case is usu-
ally considered with reference to the locality of practice.t0 -• Attorneys who
practice in a metropolis may be charged with a higher degree of care than
members of a rural bar," but the latter should be no less well versed than the
former in general principals of law. 12  The distinction on the basis of
locality is clearly set forth in Fenaille v. Coudert where the court said:
In assuming the employment of plaintiffs, the skill and knowledge
they professed, must be considered with reference to the locality
of their practice. In the abseice of any express declaration on the
subject, they will be presumed to have held themselves out as pos-
sessing such skill and knowledge as attorneys practicing (in the state
of New York) might reasonably be supposed to possess, and no
more. As attorneys of New York they are not presumed to know
the laws of a foreign state. Nor did they impliedly undertake that
they had such knowledge, by accepting an cmploymient which . . .
was, in terms, limited to drawing a contract in all respects binding
between the parties.'3
The attorneys in this case had been employed to draw a contract for build-
ing on lands in New Jersey. They failed to advise their clients of the laws
of that state respecting the necessity of filing of such contracts for the pro-
tection against claims, of workmen and material men under the mechanics'
lien law.
The rule is different if the attorney specifically contracts to perform
particular services in a place foreign to his place of practice. He is then held
to the same standard as lawyers in that foreign place. An attorney who
undertook to prepare a chattel mortgage to be filed in another state was held
liable for damages to his client where the mortgage did not comply with the
statutes of that state. The court said that every lawyer should know that
the law governing the creation of liens on personal property by chattel
mortgage is statute law, and that the statute law of onc state differs from
that of another. If he is not familiar with the statutes it is his duty to
inform himself; not to do so and to prepare the documents in such a manner
that they have no legal potency is a negligent discharge of his duty.14 The
attorney, therefore, like any other workman. by undertaking the work rep-
resents that he is capable of performing it in a skillful manner. Borrowing
the words of advice given by the court in Degen v. Steinbrink, "If the
9. O'Rarr v. Alexander, 37 Ca. 195 (1867); Morris v. Muller, 113 N.I.L. 46, 172
Atl. 63 (1934); McCullough v. Sullivan, 102 N..L. 381, 132 Atl. 102 (1926); Olson
v. North, 276 II1. App. 457 (1934).
10. ,enaille v. Coudert, 44 N.J.L. 286 (1882).
11. WEEKS O N ATORNEYS § 289 (1892).
12. MECnEm oN AGENCY § 2192 (2d ed. 1914).
13. 44 N.I.L. 286, 291 (1882).
14. Degen v. Steinbrink, 202 App, Div. 477, 195 N.Y. Supp. 810 (1st Dep't 1922),
aff'd, 236 N.Y. 669, 142 N.E. 328 (1923).
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attorney is not competent to skillfully and properly perform the work, he
should not undertake the service."'1
In determining the degree of skill required reference is also made to the
particular duty which the attorney undertakes to perform.' A lawyer
claiming to be a general practitioner must possess the skill and exhibit the
diligence of an ordinary lawyer. A person claiming to be a tax expert,
admiralty lawyer or other specialist, while not expected to be an expert out-
side his own field, must exercise due skill and diligence in his specialized
field.' 7 In other words, if the lawyer holds himself out as an expert in
taxation, it is not unreasonable to expect him to possess the same degree of
skill and knowledge as the reasonable tax expert in his locality.
Before entering into a discussion of liability for specific acts of negli-
gence and unskillfulness, let us consider the courts' views as to the attor-
ney's duty to continue the relationship once established, and his duty to
sever it if his interest becomes adverse to that of the client.
Owing to the relationship between the attorney and his client and to
the influence of the attorney over the client growing out of that relation,
the courts scrutinize most closely all transactions between them.16 Justice
Story in his Cominentaries on Equity Jurisprudence"' said:
The situation of an attorney, or solicitor, puts it in his power to
avail himself, not only of the necessities of his client, but of his
good nature, liberality, and credulity, to obtain undue advantages
bargains, and gratuities. Hence the law, with wise providence, not
only watches over all transactions of parties in this predicament;
but often interposes to declare transactions void, which, between
other persons would be unobjectionable. 20
It is generally recognized that the client has a right to terminate the
relationship between himself and attorney, with or without cause, at his
election. The existence or nonexistence of a valid cause bears only to the
attorney's right to compensation." But the attorney, once he accepts em-
ployment, is obligated to conduct to its termination any action in which he
represents his client. He cannot sever the relationship except for good
cause. 22 The relation is of the highest confidential character. [he contract
of employment implies that the attorney shall render faithful and honest
service. He has no right to use his position as an attorney to bargain for a
15. 202 App. Div. 477, 482, 195 N.Y. Supp. 810, 814 (1st Dep't, 1922), aff'd,
236 N.Y. 669, 142 N.E. 328 (1923).
16. Cox v. Sullivan, 7 Ga. 144 (1849).
17. See note 11 supra.
18. Davant v. Lambdin, 135 Fla. 700, 186 So. 201 (1939); Halstead v. Florence
Growers' Ass'n, 104 Fla. 21, 139 So. 132 (1932); Williams v. Bailey, 69 Fla. 225, 67
So. 877 2 311 18357
19. o 1 13)
20. Cf. Halstead v. Florence Growers' Ass'n, 104 Fla. 21, 139 So. 132 (1932);
Pinkington v. Rose, 88 Fla. 547, 102 So. 751 (1925).
21. Carey v. Gulfport, 140 Fla. 40, 191 So. 45 (1939); Goodkind v. Wolkowsky,
132 Fla. 63, 180 So. 538 (1938); United States v. Pittman, 80 Fla. 423, 86 So. 567
(1920).
22. Feur v. Feur, 156 Fla. 117, 22 So.2d 641 (1945).
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personal advantage with the adversaries in the action.23  If, at any time, the
interest of the attorney becomes adverse or hostile to his client, he should
cease to represent him. In such case he must give due notice of his with-
drawal in order that his client may secure other counsel.
2 4
It is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to lay down a general rule
which should control the measure of liability in all cases. The lawyer is said
to be liable to his client for ordinary neglect or want of skill. 25 What con-
stitutes want of skill or ordinary neglect must be decided by the facts of
the particular case under consideration, 2 and, of course, this is a question
for the jury. 27  It has been held, however, that the attorney is entitled to a
presumption that he has properly discharged his duty until the contrary
is shown.28
In a suit against an attorney for negligence the client must prove the
attorney's employment, his neglect of a reasonable duty, and that such neg-
ligence resulted in, and was the proximate cause of his loss.29 Proving loss
may be difficult in certain cases. In Roehl v. Ralph 0 the attorney failed
to file an answer in an action on a note. It was held that the client could
not recover unless he could show that he had a defense to the note which
the court could have submitted to the jury in the action.81
The client must, of course, be prompt in bringing his action so as not
to be barred by the statute of limitations.32 When an attorney is charge-
able with negligence or want of skill his contract is violated and the right
of action commences. In Wilcox Y. Plummers"3 a promissory note was placed
in the hands of an attorney for collection. He instituted suit against the
drawer, but neglected to do so against the indorser. The drawer proved
insolvent. The attorney then sued the indorser but because of a misnomer
of the plaintiffs was nonsuited. By this time, action against the indorser
was barred by the statute of limitations. It was agreed that the attorney
was liable to the client for his blunder, but it was held that the cause of
action started against the attorney at the time the blunder was committed
23. Chalfield v. Simonson, 92 N.Y. 209 (1883).
24. United States v. Pittman, 80 Fla. 423, 86 So. 567 (1920).
25. Cox v. Sullivan, 7 Ga. 144 (1849).
26. O'Barr v. Alexander. 37 Ga. 195 (1867).
27. O'Neill v. Gray, 30 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1929) (Attorney brought an action
against a defendant as a corporation, when in fact it was not. He failed to anend the
complaint or file a new one before the statute of limitations barred the action. It was
held for the jury to decide whether or not the conduct of the litigation was reasonably
skillful); Slade v. Harris, 105 Conn. 436, 135 At]. 570 (1927); Werle v. Rurnsey, 278
N.Y. 186, 15 N.E.2d 572 (1938).
28. Slade v. Harris, 105 Conn. 436, 135 Atl. 570 (1927).
29. Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 31 A.2d 312 (1943); Watson v. Calvert, 91
Md. 25, 45 Atl. 879 (1900); Morris v. Muller, 113 N.J.L. 46, 172 Atl. 63 (1934).
30. 84 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. App. 1935).
31. See Weekly v. Knight, 116 Fla- 721, 156 So. 625 (1934).
32. Wilcox v. Plummers, 29 U.S. 172 (1830); Browder v. DaCosta, 91 Fla. 1. 109
So. 448 (1926); Galloway v. Hood, 69 Ohio App. 278, 43 N.E.2d 631 (1941).
33. 29 U.S. 172 (1830).
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and not when the statute of limitations barred the action against the in-
dorser. Therefore, the client's action was barred?,
The usual case against an attorney is based upon his neglect to perform
the services which he agrees to perform, expressly or impliedly, when he
accepts employment by a client.31' He is answerable for his neglect to his
immediate employer only, and not to the latter's assigns or any other third
person, with whom the attorney is not in privity. : " But once the attorney
and client relationship is established, the attorney's obligation to his client
is the same whether he is paid by the state or the client, and whether he is
paid much or little, or nothing at all.3 7
As to the layman it is generally stated that ignorance of the law is no
defense. This rule applies with equal, if not greater, force to the attorney.
He is liable for loss resulting to the client as a consequence of his ignorance
or nonobservance of the rules of the courts in which he practices. 38  If a
statute or decision of his own state has been published long enough to jus-
tify the belief that it was known to the profession, then a disregard of such
law renders the lawyer accountable for losses.39 He is liable for negligence
if he knew the law and misapplied it, or for want of skill if he was ignorant
of it? In Schirmer v. Nethercutt 41 the client hired the attorney to draw
the last will and testament of his grandmother. The attorney permitted the
client, named as a beneficiary in the will, to act as a witness thereto. As a
result the client lost the entire value of the money and property he would
have received. The attorney was held liable for this loss. In another case
an attorney was held liable where, having procured funds for a client under
disability, he paid the funds to a court which was without jurisdiction, under
well settled law, to receive such fund.42  On the other hand the attorney is
not liable for errors in judgment upon points of new occurrence, or of
doubtful construction.48
When the attorney is cmployed for the purpose of advising his client
and the client relies on this advice, the attorney is liable for the resulting
damages if he has not exhibited a fair degree of professional skill and knowl-
34. Wilcox %'. Plunmers, 29 U.S, 172 (1830). But c. Browder v. DaCosta, 91
Fla. 1, 109 So. 448 (1926); Galloway v. Hood, 69 Ohio App. 278, 23 N.E,2d 631 (1941).
35. Weekly v. Knight, 116 Fla. 721. 156 So. 625 (1934).
36. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879) (Attorney held not liable for
giving, in answer to a casual inquiry, erroneous information as to the contents of a deed
where the relation of attorney and client did not exist); 3 SHEARtAN AND REnFIELD ON
NEGLIGENCE § 584 (Rev. Ed. 1941).
37. Wilson v. State, 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E.2d 848 (1944); Rose v. Davis, 288 Ky.
674, 157 S.W.2d 285 (1941).
38. Michigan Central R.R. v. Morgan, 227 Mich, 491, 198 N.W. 967 (1924);
In re Woods, 158 Tenn. 383, 13 S.W.2d 800 (1929).
39. Fenaille v. Coudert, 44 N.J.L. 286 (1882). But ef. Degen v. Stienbrink, 202
App. Div. 477, 195 N.Y. Supp. 810 (1st Dep't 1922), aff'd, 236 N.Y. 669, 142 N.E.
328 (1923).
40. In re Woods, 158 Tenn. 383, 13 S.W.2d 800 (1Q29); Gimbel v. WValdnian, 193
Misc. 758, 84 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
41. 157 Wash. 172, 288 Pac. 265 (1930).
42. In re Woods, 158 Tenn. 383, 13 S.W.2d 800 (1929).
43. O'Barr v. Alexander, 37 Ga. 195 (1867).
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edge 4 4 An attorney was held liable for damages based on his negligence in
advising his clients that a certain contract for the sale of real estate, which
the clients were about to take over by assignment, was a legal, valid and
enforceable contract, when in fact it was not. 47' However, an attorney was
held not liable because of a mistake in the expression of an opinion as to
the probabilities of realizing a certain sum for the sale of real property.46
The same rules apply as to liability for negligence and want of skill in
searching titles. The client is entitled to a good and marketable title, that
is, a title free from reasonable doubt.4" An attorney who certifies a title to
be perfect, or that the property is unencumbered, is liable for any loss to
his client, if, in fact, there is a cloud upon the title or an incumbrance upon
the property which a reasonably careful search would have disclosed. 4
While the degree of knowledge and skill is the same, the lawyer seems
to enjoy more freedom from liability in the actual conduct of litigation than
in any other phase of his activity.49 The reason for this relative freedom of
liability is because litigation necessarily involves questions of judgment.
As has been said, attorneys are usually not liable for errors of judgment.Y°
In Byrnes v. Palmer the court said:
In a litigation a lawyer is well warranted in taking chances. To
some extent litigation is a game of chance. The conduct of a law-
suit involves questions of judgment and discretion, as to which
even the most distinguished members of the profession may differ.
They often present subtle and doubtful questions of law. If in
such cases a lawyer errs on a question not elementary or conclusive-
ly settled by authority, that error is one of judgmcnt, for which lie
is not liable.5 '
The attorney has sufficient control over the litigation, without consult-
ing his client, to make agreements respecting procedure which do not affect
the substantive rights of the client. 2  But failure to take the necessary steps
for due entry and enrollient of a judgment after it is received will render
the attorney liable for any loss sustained by the client. 3  In one case, after
successfully prosecuting a suit for his client, the attorney was instructed by
the court to prepare findings. Because of an error in the preparation (which
was also overlooked by the court) the case was reversed. It was held that
44. Kendall v. Rogers, 181 .Md. 606, 31 A.2d 312 (1943); Byrnes v. Palmer, IS
App. Div. 1, 45 N.Y. Supp. 479 (2d Dep't 1897).
45. Fabrey v. Jay, 104 N.I.L. 617, 141 At!. 780 (1928).
46. Relnping v. \Vharton, 56 Neb. 536, 76 N.W. 1076 (1898).
47. Byrnes v. Palmer, 18 App. Div. 1, 45 N.Y. Supp. 479 (2d Dep't 1897).
48. Lawali v. Gorman, 180 Pa. St. 532, 37 Ati. 98 (1897); Hill v. Cloud, 48 Ga.
App. 506, 173 S.E. 190 (1934).
49. McCoy v. Hydrick, 143 S.C. 135, 141 S.E. 174 (1928).
50. O'Barr v. Alexander, 37 Ga. 195 (1867); McCullough v. Sullivan, 102 N.I.L.
381, 132 At]. 102 (19Z6); Rapuzzi v. Stetson, 160 App. Div. 150, 145 N.Y. Supp. 455
(3rd Dep't 1914).
51. Byrnes v. Palmer, 18 App. Div. 1, 3, 45 N.Y. Supp. 479, 481 (2d Dep't 1897).
52. Cahaley v. Cahaley, 216 Minn. 175, 12 N.W.2d 182 (1943).
53. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Holliday, 73 Fla. 269, 74 So. 479 (1917).
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the mistake was inexcusable.54 The fact that the trial court overlooked the
error did not release the attorney from responsibility to his client.
Not only is the attorney liable for his own lack of skill and negligence
but, under the general rules of partnership and agency, he is liable also for
that of his partners5" and of his clerks.5 If a member of a firm of attorneys
is acting within the scope of his employment, the partners are jointly and
severally liable for his acts-" with or without their knowledge of participa-
tions 8 It is obvious, therefore, that the attorney should use extraordinary
care in selecting his partners and clerks.
The standards set by the legal profession are high. It is apparent from
this discussion that the courts will not hesitate to hold the attorney liable
for failure to maintain these standards. While preparing this paper the
problems herein were discussed with several young attorneys and law stu-
dents. The general consensus of opinion was to the effect that the problem
would be adequately solved by insurance coverage. True, this would protect
both the client and the attorney from financial loss, and, by all means, the
client's interest should be so protected. But the immediate financial loss is
not the only problem involved. No insurance can pay for the public humili-
ation suffered by the attorney nor repair his ruined ieputation. It cannot
replace the loss of dignity to the profession as a whole caused by the negli-
gence of a few of its members. While the field of preventative law has not
progressed as far as the field of preventative medicine, the interests of the
client, the attorney and the profession would be greatly advanced if the
individual attorney would practice preventative law on himself.
NiciioLAs A. CRANE
FACTORS AFFECTING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
I NTRODUCH[ON
The doctrine of punitive damages is so well settled that a dissertation
on its raisort d'etre would be of little value. Briefly, however, exemplary or
punitive damages are generally awarded when the wrong has been corn-
mitted with malice, moral turpitude, wantonness, willfulness, outrageous
aggravation or with reckless indifference for the rights of others.' Punitive
damages have been awarded in contract actions, but such awards are rela-
tivelv rare. Generally, punitive damages are not recoverable in a breach of
54. Armstrong v. Adams, 102 Cal. App. 677, 283 Pac. 97l" (1929).
55. CRANE ON PARTNERSHIPS § 54 (2d ed. 1952); 3 SIIEANIUAN AND REDNIFiFLD ON
NEGLICENCE § 586 (Rev. ed. 1941).
56. Armstrong v. Adams, 102 Col. App. 677, 28 Pac. 871 (1929).
57. Rouse v. Pollard, 130 N.J. Eq. 204, 21 A.2d 801 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941); Riley
v. Larocque, 163 Misc. 423, 297 N.Y. Supp. 756 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
58. Priddy v. MacKenzie, 205 Mo. 181, 103 S.W. 968 (1907); Model Building and
Loan Ass'n v. Reeves, 201 App. Div. 329, 194 N.Y. Supp. 383 (Ist Dep't 1922). But
cf. Wildermann v. Wachtell, 149 Misc. 623, 267 N.Y. Supp. 840 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
1. Dr. P. Phillips & Sons v. Kilgore, 152 Fla. 578. 12 So.2d 465 (1943).
